Roper v.
Simmons, No. 03-633
Argued October 13, 2004.
DPIC Summary:
Majority Opinion
By a vote of 5-4, the U.S. Supreme Court on March 1, 2005 held that the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the execution of offenders who were
under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority (Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter,
and Stevens, JJ.) stated:
When a juvenile offender commits a heinous crime, the State can exact
forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, but the State cannot
extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his
own humanity.
The Court reaffirmed the necessity of referring to “the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” to determine which
punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual. The Court
reasoned that the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of
states, the infrequent use of the punishment even where it remains on the books,
and the consistent trend toward abolition of the juvenile death penalty
demonstrated a national consensus against the practice. The Court
determined that today our society views juveniles as categorically less culpable
than the average criminal.
Reliance on Atkins
The Court outlined the similarities between its analysis of the
constitutionality of executing juvenile offenders and the constitutionality of
executing the mentally retarded. Prior to 2002, the Court had refused to
categorically exempt mentally retarded persons from capital punishment. Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). However, in Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Court held that standards of
decency had evolved in the 13 years since Penry
and that a national consensus had formed against such executions, demonstrating
that the execution of the mentally retarded is cruel and unusual punishment.
Before this historic ruling, the Court concluded in 1989 in Stanford
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), that the execution of 16- and
17-year-old offenders was not constitutionally barred. The Court now
concludes that since Stanford, a
national consensus has formed against the execution of juvenile offenders, and
the practice violates society’s “evolving standards of decency.” The
Court overruled its decision in Stanford, thereby setting the minimum age for
eligibility for the death penalty at 18.
The Court explained that the primary criterion for determining whether a
particular punishment violates society’s evolving standards of decency is
objective evidence of a national consensus as expressed by legislative
enactments and jury practices. The majority opinion found significant that 30
states prohibit the juvenile death penalty, including 12 that have rejected the
death penalty altogether. The Court counted the states with no death
penalty, pointing out that “a State’s decision to bar the death penalty
altogether of necessity demonstrates a judgment that the death penalty is
inappropriate for all offenders, including juveniles. The Court further
noted that juries sentenced juvenile offenders to death only in rare cases and
the execution of juveniles is infrequent. The Court found a consistent
trend toward abolition of the practice of executing juveniles and ruled that the
impropriety of executing juveniles has gained wide recognition.
In addition to considering evidence of a national consensus as expressed by
legislative enactments and jury practices, the court recognized that it must
also apply its own independent judgment in determining whether a particular
punishment is disproportionately severe. When ruling that juvenile
offenders cannot with reliability be classified as among the worst offenders,
the Court found significant that juveniles are vulnerable to influence, and
susceptible to immature and irresponsible behavior. In light of
juveniles’ diminished culpability, neither retribution nor deterrence provides
adequate justification for imposing the death penalty.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, said:
Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed
on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial
degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.
International Confirmation
The Court further noted that that the execution of juvenile offenders violated
several international treaties, including the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and stated that the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the
juvenile death penalty provides confirmation for the Court’s own conclusion
that the death penalty is disproportional punishment for offenders under 18.
Concurring Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg, stating:
Perhaps even more important than our specific holding today is our
reaffirmation of the basic principle that informs the Court’s interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment. If the meaning of that Amendment had been frozen when
it was originally drafted, it would impose no impediment to the execution of
7-year-old children today.
O'Connor's Dissent
Justice O’Connor dissented, criticizing the Missouri Supreme Court for failing
to follow the precedent established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Stanford
(before the Supreme Court overruled Stanford,
the Missouri court in this case concluded that standards of decency had evolved
such that executing juveniles was no longer constitutional). O’Connor
agreed that objective evidence presented in Simmons was similar to that
presented in Atkins, but while there was
no support for the practice of executing the mentally retarded, at least eight
states had considered and adopted legislation permitting the execution of 16-
and 17-year-old offenders. O’Connor argued that the difference in
maturity between adults and juveniles was neither universal nor significant
enough to justify a rule excluding juveniles from the death penalty.
Justice O’Connor did recognize the relevance of international law, and
expressly rejected Justice Scalia’s contention that international law has no
place in evaluating Eighth Amendment claims.
Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, also
dissented, arguing that the Court improperly substituted its own judgment for
that of the people in outlawing juvenile executions. He criticized the
majority for counting non-death penalty states toward a national consensus
against juvenile executions. Scalia also rejected the Court’s use of
international law to confirm its finding of a national consensus, stating that
“‘Acknowledgement’ of foreign approval has no place in the legal opinion
of this Court . . .” Like Justice O’Connor, Scalia criticized the
Court for failing to admonish the Missouri Court for its “flagrant
disregard” of the Court’s ruling in Stanford.
The Court’s ruling in Roper v. Simmons
affects 72 juvenile offenders in 12 states.